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 Is Zero the best Price? 
Optimal Pricing of Mobile Applications 
1 Introduction 
Mobile markets, and in particular mobile applications, as disruptive innovations, 
have revolutionized the software industry. Whereas software has its usage in an or-
ganizational, job- or efficiency-related environment, mobile application changed the 
way we use software as everyday life artifacts. Mobile applications in combination 
with smart mobile devices can be regarded as today’s archetype example of ubiqui-
tous computing. This development has considerably contributed to the emergence of a 
new type of users. By the use of mobile applications, consumers are enabled to bene-
fit from supporting software in their everyday life, which causes a revolution of the 
software industry: the disclosure of the consumer market. Mobile applications can be 
used to perform every kind of task, and users benefit while handling their everyday 
routine. Everyday activities, e.g., comprise navigation, buying lists, communication, 
scheduling, gaming, information, sports, and learning are almost “naturally” carried 
out or supported through the use of mobile applications. Or as Apple phrases it in one 
of their slogans: “There is an app for that” [1]. 
In terms of sheer numbers, mobile application markets are by no means compara-
ble with markets for traditional software products. More than 2 million mobile appli-
cations are currently provided in the leading app stores (Google Play, Apple App 
Store, Windows Phone Store) and 21 billion apps were downloaded worldwide in 
2013 [2]. Despite of the various purposes and functionalities of mobile applications, 
the pricing structure of the market is very simple: most apps are offered for free. Ac-
cording to estimates, roughly 95% of mobile applications in 2017 will be offered for 
free [3], while the small group of fee-based mobile applications generates about 50% 
of app store revenue [4]. 
The decision about the price of mobile applications is one of the most important 
managerial decisions [5], and the prices set for a mobile application play an important 
role in positioning, and thereby can have a huge economic impact [6], [7], [8]. In the 
market of mobile applications, pricing should be a topic of interest from an economic, 
management science, marketing, and, increasingly, computer science perspective [7]. 
This leads us to our major research question: How to optimally set prices of mobile 
applications depending on their utility-classification?  
Each of the following chapters sequentially contributes to the answer of this ques-
tion. Chapter 2 focuses on the managerial relevance of pricing and the specific char-
acteristics of mobile applications. In chapter 3, we develop a model for mobile appli-
cation pricing and derive advises for profit-maximizing mobile application pricing. 
The article closes with a discussion and conclusion in chapter 4. 
  
2 Pricing and mobile application markets 
2.1 Relevance of pricing 
The decision about the price of a good is one of the most important managerial de-
cisions [5].
1
 Strategic decisions to influence markets are called instruments of market-
ing [9]. In the (marketing) literature, these instruments are grouped into three to five 
submixes – the so-called marketing mix [10]. [10]´s marketing mix of 4 “P´s” (prod-
uct, promotion, place, and price) is a well-known classification of strategic marketing 
[10]. This classification includes the kind of product or service offered to the consum-
er (“P” = product), the way it is communicated to the customer (“P” = promotion), the 
way of offering the product or service to the customer (“P” = place), and the amount 
of money the customer will have to pay for the product or service (“P” = price). 
The prices set for a product or service play an important role in positioning a prod-
uct or service, and thereby can have a huge economic impact [6], [7], [8]. First of all, 
the pricing decision has direct influence on the profitability, and thus it plays an im-
portant role concerning companies’ strategic focus [11]. Besides the direct impact on 
the financial performance, prices have an important influence on various marketing 
decisions, e.g. price as proxy measure for quality, price as an anchor for customers, 
and low prices to attract additional customers [6]. [6] attribute different roles to pric-
ing; according to them it is a signal to the buyer, an instrument of competition, the 
improvement of financial performance and the result of marketing program considera-
tions. 
Pricing is becoming the more and more dominate “P” in the marketing mix. While 
determining an amount of money for a products or services often was seen as the 
“remaining” “P”, which was set at the last stage, and used for merely tactical reasons, 
pricing as a strategic decision in the very early stage of the development becomes 
more and more relevant [12]. [6] point to the strategic role of pricing: “Strategic 
choices about market targets, positioning strategies, and products and distribution 
strategies set guidelines for both price and promotion strategies. Product quality and 
features, type of distribution channel, end-users served, and the functions performed 
by value chain members all help establish a feasible price range. When an organiza-
tion forms a new distribution network, selection of the channel and intermediaries 
may be driven by price.” [6] 
Consequently, pricing as an interdisciplinary field is a topic of interest in various 
fields, e.g. economics, management science, marketing, and, increasingly, computer 
science [5], [7]. In terms of pricing theory, two main lines of research are established: 
the behavioral science approach and the decision science approach [5]. Whereas the 
behavioral science approach has its roots in empirical research, the decisional ap-
proach is based on the tradition of micro-economic theory. The goal of the latter ap-
proach is to search for optimal prices, making use of theoretical models [5]. 
A lot of work was done in the field of pricing, but the literature concerning mobile 
application pricing is scarce. In mobile apps markets, we observe the phenomenon 
                                                          
1 The focus of this article is mainly the price a profit-maximizing company sets. 
  
that prices are set in a standardized way. Despite the uniqueness of several mobile 
applications, most apps are given for free.
2
 It also seems that there exist price thresh-
olds, including 0.19 Euro, 0.79 Euro or 0.99 Euro. To get a deeper understanding of 
pricing in mobile application markets, we outline the specific characteristic of mobile 
application markets. Subsequently we provide a formal pricing model for apps mar-
kets. 
2.2 Characteristics mobile applications 
The pricing decision, and at the end of the day the prices set in the market, depend 
on various factors. [9] group the factors which affect the pricing decision into three 
levels: internal factors, external macro factors and external micro factors. Internal 
factors like the goals and the strategy of the company, the type and cost structure of 
the product, and economies of scope are important for pricing, too [9]. In terms of 
external macro factors they identify macroeconomic, societal, governmental, and 
technological circumstances. In the micro sphere pricing has to be done, taking into 
account the competitors and the reactions of the customers [9].  
Consequently, the most important factors for pricing decisions are the nature of the 
product or service. Apps, like traditional application software, can be characterized as 
closed and not integrated software packages, which are dependent on their underlying 
OS [13]. We follow the definition of Buck et al. who defines apps “as application 
software programs, which use web and cloud applications and run on smart mobile 
devices (SMDs) [like smartphones and tablets]. They can be purchased and installed 
depending on their operating system and perform highly fragmented everyday tasks. 
Importantly, mobile applications are embedded in mobile ecosystems, i.e. OS-based 
platforms, which provide profile-bound ubiquitous services for mobile devices.” [14] 
According to the underlying definition, mobile applications are digital goods and 
therefor have specific characteristics. In terms of pricing, the most important charac-
teristic is that marginal costs are not relevant in the context of mobile applications 
[15].
3
 This means, that only the first copy of the software product has possibly rela-
tively high fixed costs, but every following copy does not cause any additional varia-
ble cost, like costs for copying and providing. 
Furthermore, software products can be classified into two main groups: standard 
software and individual software [16]. Standard software is a pre-developed and com-
pleted software package which provides a uniquely defined set of applications for the 
mass market and can be purchased in the open market. Individual software is devel-
oped for a single entity and provides a customized problem solution. Apps are pre-
developed software packages, which are sold via online stores to the mass market, and 
thus can be characterized as standard software. Thus, the full function of mobile ap-
plications can be sold by degrees in little slices via so called in-app-purchases (which 
can also be seen as complementary goods or upselling) [8]. 
                                                          
2 In terms of direct monetization. 
3 In this paper we do not consider the very little cost for copying and providing software in 
cloud environments. 
  
The third specific characteristics of mobile applications are possible network ef-
fects [17], [18]. There exists a broad literature concerning network effects and the 
utility consumers derive from networks; including for example [19], [20], [21], and 
[22]. Network effects exist, when “[…] the utility a given user derives from the good 
depends upon the number of other users who are in the same “network” […].“[19] In 
digital networks, the increase in utility depends on the diffusion and the reach of a 
critical mass of a mobile application.  
The fourth specific characteristic has to be seen in personal data as currency in 
mobile application markets. Mobile application markets are typical examples for so-
called free or freemium markets, i.e. most apps include at least a free basic version. 
However, this does not mean that consumers do not have to pay for the benefits they 
derive. Although there is often no money involved in the economic exchange situation 
of an mobile application purchase, the provider does not offer the mobile application 
“for free” More precisely, private information of the consumer is generated as the 
majority of apps receive, store, or process personal data, although other revenue 
mechanisms are used simultaneously (e.g. monetary payment for the app, in-app ad-
vertising).  
The fifth specific characteristic constitutes the monopolistic purchase channel of 
mobile applications. Mobile applications, according to their definition, have to be 
bought via mobile ecosystems which provide apps in a closed online store (e.g., Ap-
ple app store, Google play store). The system entry is only provided through the 
SMD. Apps have to fulfil strict requirements in terms of design, in order to generate a 
“one face to the customer feeling”, and are therefore frequently perceived as part of 
the underlying OS and SMD, although they are separate, 3rd-party products. 
2.3 Pricing modalities of mobile applications 
Pricing decisions depend strongly on their context. Consequently, different ap-
proaches in pricing are used for different products, services, or industries. Pricing in 
different industries is addressed extensively in the Oxford Handbook of Pricing Man-
agement [23]. 
To address the question of why there exists a lot of disparity in mobile application 
pricing [24] introduced the concept of pricing modalities: “The pricing modality is the 
way that buyers, sellers, and intermediaries interact in a market to determine the price 
for a particular transaction.” [24] Thus, pricing modalities can be seen as the external 
influence factors introduced by [9]. 
[24] describes pricing modalities as the “rules of the game” which are – caused by 
the characteristics of mobile applications shown above; specifically, when consider-
ing mobile markets, particularly application stores of mobile ecosystems [24]. [24] 
provides three pure approaches to explain pricing modalities in market like applica-
tion stores: market equilibrium, institutional history, and economic sociology. 
Application stores can be characterized by the approach of institutional history as 
an outcome of the development of experiential computing, the technological evolution 
of smartphones and mobile ecosystems and the digital industry structure. Apple, with 
the further development of iTunes into iOS and the invention of the first iPhone as 
  
first mover, created a path dependence for the whole digital consumer industry [25], 
[26]. With developing (closed) mobile digital ecosystems, they created a market struc-
ture where the “rule-maker” is the intermediary who links consumers and providers in 
a closed environment. The pricing modality in mobile application markets is fixed, 
where sellers choose a price which is posted at the market. Prospective buyers either 
pay the price or do not purchase or download the mobile application [24]. According 
to [24], the fixed pricing modality incorporates four elements: 
1. Unilateral selection of a price by the 3rd-party-app-vendor 
2. The 3rd-party-app-vendor posts the price in the application store 
3. Consumers observe the price and choose whether or not to purchase 
4. The download takes place exclusively at posted or advertised prices 
As shown above, in terms of the pricing modality, mobile applications basically 
show fixed pricing. Nevertheless, fixed pricing is merely the direct and obvious pric-
ing modality, and therewith one part of the business model and the (monetization) 
strategy of mobile applications. Furthermore, consumers give access to their personal 
data when downloading mobile applications without knowing what is the value of 
their personal data currently and in the future.  
3 Modelling mobile application pricing 
3.1 Utility dimensions and price of mobile applications 
Based on their specific characteristics mobile applications have various value di-
mensions. Consumers are willing to pay the price for a mobile application on the val-
ue or utility they receive or perceive to receive [8]. These dimensions lead to the as-
sumptions of the model presented in the following section. To explain the assump-
tions of the underlying model, we choose the mobile application of “Quizduell” as an 
archetype for mobile applications with two value dimensions. “Quizduell” is an inter-
active mobile application where consumers can answer questions in several 
knowledge categories. The questions can be answered in a single mode (consumers 
can challenge themselves) and in a multiplayer mode (consumers can challenge other 
consumers). Consumers derive utility from using mobile applications. We argue that, 
based on the specific characteristics shown above, the utility of using mobile applica-
tions can be separated into two components, according to the main focus of the mo-
bile application. 
The first dimension stems from the native value the mobile application provides 
when using its basic functionalities in an individual way. We call this part of utility 
individual utility. Individual utility is achieved, when the consumers uses the mobile 
application and is not in-app-connected with other (anonymous) consumers. In the 
example of “Quizduell”, consumers derive utility when using the mobile application 
in the single mode. 
The second dimension is call collective utility. The consumers benefit from inte-
grating interconnected (anonymous) users. In the example of “Quizduell”, consumers 
  
can derive additional value when challenging other interconnected users. The concept 
of collective utility is based on the related papers, focusing on network effects. While 
[20] and [22] study a monopolistic setup with network externalities, we focus on a 
model with two competing firms. As we do, [19] study goods for which “[…] the 
utility a given user derives from the good depends upon the number of other users 
who are in the same “network” […]. “ However, contrary to our model, [19] assume 
the firms to compete in quantities instead of prices. Furthermore, they answer ques-
tions of compatibility of two or more networks. However, our model focuses on the 
question of optimal pricing and the optimal amount of advertisement in the context of 
mobile applications and network effects. 
In terms of mobile applications, price can be seen as the reward for the utility con-
sumers derive. Consequently, the price reveals a negative utility. We assume that 
based on the specific characteristics of mobile applications, the disutility when using a 
mobile application can be interpreted in two ways. According to [27] B2C-income 
types classification for the internet, we identify price, contact and information as in-
come types from B2C-App-exchanges. 
The first dimension of disutility is the monetary price paid when downloading an 
app. 
The second dimension is the price consumers pay for using their personal data re-
ceived via the permissions consumers grant for when downloading and using the app. 
In the following we subsume contact and information under the second dimension of 
negative utility because only with the permission of information of personal data 
firms can get into contact with consumers. Consumers can benefit from ‘free apps’ in 
exchange for their personal data. All these aspects are incorporated in our model, 
presented in section 3.2. 
3.2 Exogenous market share 
We model the market for application similar to the model of [28], and assume that 
two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, serve the market. The market share of each firm is exog-
enously given by  for firm 1 and by       by firm 2. Both firms offer an identical 
app. Each individual i or j derives the following utility depending on whether she uses 
the mobile application of firm 1 or 2.  
                 
                    
in the case of individual i buying from firm 1, and  
  (     )         
                        
in the case of individual j buying from firm 2. 
   stands for the individual consumption of user i, using the mobile application of 
firm 1, and    is the consumption of individual  , using firm 2's app.  and     
stand for the market share of firm 1 and firm 2. The utility of individual   and   in-
crease in the consumption    and    Apart from    and    the utility also depends 
positively on the market share  and    . As user       is assumed to be atomistic 
  
small, the number of other consumers ex-cept for the user       may be approximated 
by       .  
These two components model the fact that the utility from using a mobile applica-
tion may stem from two sources. On the one hand the individuals derive a positive 
individual utility from using the app. On the other hand, their utility is positively re-
lated to the numbers of other players using the app. 
How often a consumer uses the mobile application depends on the utility she de-
rives from using it; e.g. the user maximizes its utility, by deciding about how often to 
use the mobile application. There is a binding constraint to the usage, as we assume 
that it is not for free, but users have to pay a usage fee of    or   . This may come as 
a price consumers have to pay each time they use the application, or which is the case 
we are looking at: consumers are exposed to a certain amount of advertisement each 
time they use the mobile application. That advertisement can be seen as disutility, as 
we know from various sources. Consumers report that they do not like or want to see 
advertisement when using their mobile applications [29]. 
We assume that there are no differences in the individual and collective utility con-
sumers derive independent from using the mobile application of firm 1 or firm 2.  
Solving the above game via backward induction implies staring at the second stage 
at which the users decide about their optimal usage level. Given an exogenously mar-
ket share, the firms decide at the first stag about the amount of advertisement    and 
  . 
Maximizing equations (1) and (2) with respect to    and   , leads to 
       
       
  
 
and  
       
         
  
 
As we assume that all consumers   buying from firm 1 and all consumers   buying 
from firm 2 are identical, their optimal consumptions are equivalent to the optimal 
consumption levels of all other individuals buying the mobile application from the 
same firm.
4
 Furthermore as explained above, we assume that firms only have to bear 
fixed costs, but no unit variable cost, neither for producing the mobile application, nor 
for displaying the advertisement. For sufficiently small fixed costs they do not influ-
ence the decision of the firms to be active in the market. Consequently, for simplicity, 
we assume that the fixed costs are set to zero. Based on these assumptions, the firms 
maximize their profits given by 
                    
and 
                            
In equilibrium firms set 
  
  
 
 
       
and 
                                                          
4 Alternatively, one can model individual i and j as average consumer, buying the mobile appli-
cation from firm 1 or 2, which leaves the results unchanged. 
  
  
  
 
 
         
leading to 
  
  
    
  
 
and 
  
  
      
  
  
The corresponding profits in equilibrium are given by  
   
               
  
 
and 
   
                     
  
 
Profits in equilibrium strictly increase in   , respectively   . Furthermore, a larger 
market share leads to larger profits in equilibrium. However, the assumption that pric-
es are not related to the market shares may be rather unrealistic in the mobile applica-
tion market. It is more likely that there exists a negative correlation between prices 
and market shares. Consequently in section 3.3, we introduce a model in which the 
market shares are endogenously determined by the prices firms set.  
3.3 Endogenous market share 
We still assume that firm 1 and firm 2 serve the market, offering a horizontally dif-
ferentiated app. For each consumer buying the mobile application is related to a fixed 
utility of  , which is the same independently from buying from firm 1 or 2. The con-
sumers have to pay the price    or   , depending on whether they buy their product 
from firm 1 or firm 2, which reduces their net-utility. Furthermore, we assume the 
mobile applications to be horizontally differentiated. This means that consumers do 
not perceive the mobile applications as homogeneous, but to them they differ due to 
certain characteristics. Examples for such characteristics may be different numbers of 
downloads, ratings, reviews, and the ranking in the app store. Furthermore, each con-
sumer has an individual concept of her own ideal, fictitious mobile applications, 
which she compares to the two real world applications of firm 1 and 2. Consumers 
then chose the mobile application of firm 1 or firm 2 depending on which one comes 
closest to their ideal mobile application. Or put differently, they choose the mobile 
application that minimizes the distance between their ideal mobile application and the 
real mobile application. As in the model of [28], the distance may also be interpreted 
as causing travelling costs. In our model, we assume that the travelling costs are linear 
in the distance, and scaled by a parameter  . For illustrative purposes, we assume that 
the consumers may be ordered on a line with a total length of one, according to their 
preferences with the mobile application of firm 1 at the left end, and the mobile appli-
cation of firm 2 at the right end of the line. For the consumer that is indifferent be-
tween buying from firm 1 or firm 2 the following has to hold: 
                           
  
where     [0,1] stands for the position of the consumer. All consumers to the left of 
this indifferent consumer prefer the mobile application of firm 1, as it gives them a 
higher net-utility than the mobile application of firm 2. For all consumers to the right 
of the indifferent consumer the opposite holds, and they prefer the mobile application 
of firm 2 over the one of firm 1. 
Solving equation (3) for the indifferent consumer  ̂ yields 
 ̂  
 
 
 
     
  
  
 ̂ may also be interpreted as the market share of firm 1 and 1- ̂ as the market share 
of firm 2.  ̂ depends negatively on the price of firm 1 and positively on the price of 
firm 2. Normalizing the total size of the market to one, the market share  ̂ corresponds 
directly to the number of consumers each firm serves. At a second step, we assume 
that the buying decision and the decision of how often to use the mobile application 
are not related. This means that at the point of time when the consumers decide which 
mobile application to buy they do not consider how often they are going to use the 
mobile application and moreover how large the individual and collective utility will 
be. This assumption is rather straightforward in the context of mobile applications, as 
their download can be seen as impulsive purchase decisions [14]. How often a con-
sumer use the mobile application depends once more on the utility she derives from 
using it. Similar to equation (1) and (2), the utilities for the individuals i and j are 
given by  
       ̂            
      ̂               
and 
  (    ̂   )         
         ̂                
 
where        stands once more for the individual consumption of user      ,  ̂ , 
    ̂ , for the market share of firm 1 (firm 2) and   ,   for the amount of adver-
tisement the user is expose to per usage.  
We solve the game once more via backward induction. At the third stage, the users 
decide about their optimal usage level. At the second stage the users make their buy-
ing decision and at the first stage the firms decide about their prices p1 and p2 and the 
amount of advertisement    and   . 
Maximizing equations (4) and (5) with respect to    and   , and using 
  ̂  
 
 
 
     
  
 
leads to 
             
                   
   
 
and 
             
                   
   
  
Based on these findings, the firms maximize their profits given by 
               ̂    ̂    
  
and 
                  ̂       ̂    
Partial derivatives with respect p1, p2 and w1, w2 lead to  
  
     
    
             
   
  
  
     
  
    
 
 
 ̂      
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and consequently  
  
     
  
 
 
 
             
   
  
       
   
  
 
 
 
       
   
  
Proof: See Appendix.  
Whether the mobile application may be classified as an individual or a collective 
application, depends on the specification of the parameters and in particular on  . 
Total individual utility a consumer buying from firm 1 derives is given by      
          
   and the collective utility by           ̂  Figure 1 depicts the relation 
between individual and collective utility depending on   for a = 5, b = 2, t = 10, 
while the dashed curve depicts the individual utility and the solid curve the collective 
utility. For this example, the two utility curves intersect for        For       the 
individual utility component exceeds the collective utility component, and or   
    vice versa. Consequently, for      the mobile application may be classified as 
individual mobile application and for       as collective mobile application.  
 
Fig. 1. Individual and collective utility depending on c, for a = 5, b = 2, t = 10 
This distinction also affects the optimal prices in equilibrium and the optimal 
amount of advertisement. Figure 2 shows that the optimal price    of firm 1 in equi-
librium are strictly decreasing in  , while the optimal amount of advertisement 
  strictly increases in  . The same relationships hold for firm 2.  
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Fig. 2. Optimal price and amount of advertisement depending on c, for a = 5, b = 2, t = 10 
We may classify mobile applications with      as individual apps, while apps 
with     are assumed to be collective apps. Figure 2 shows that zero prices for 
mobile applications may only be optimal in the case of highly collective mobile appli-
cations. The corresponding calculations were performed for a = 5, b = 2, t = 10. The 
dashed curve depicts the optimal prices in equilibrium and the solid curve the optimal 
amount of advertisement, both depending on c. 
For individual mobile applications, it is according to this model not rational to sell 
the apps at a price of zero. Furthermore, it may never be rational to have no adver-
tisement at all, ever for an individual mobile application with     . Analyzing 
firms' profits, we find that profits from selling apps decrease with increasing parame-
ter   and profits from advertisement increase with increasing parameter  .  
One could argue that in the case of for example firm 2 committing to selling at 
    , it could be rational for firm 1 to price as well at     . However even for 
that very extreme case it may only in the limit of highly collective mobile applications 
be rational for firm 1 to decrease prices to zero. Figure 3 shows for a = 5, b = 2, t = 5, 
firm 1's optimal prices in the symmetric benchmark case depicted by the solid curve, 
and in the case of      depicted by the dashed curve. 
Apart from the limit case of highly collective mobile applications, firm 1 reacts to 
firm 2 setting prices of      with positive prices. However, prices are lower than in 
the symmetric case. 
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Fig. 3. Optimal pricing strategy depending on c, for a = 5, b = 2, t =5 
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this article we answer the question of optimal pricing in the market for mobile 
applications. We classify mobile applications according to their utility components as 
individual and/or collective mobile applications.  
In our theoretical model, we offer a microeconomic approach to the question of op-
timal pricing and advertisement. Based on the model of [28], we analyze the utility 
components of mobile applications and introduce the concept of individual and col-
lective utility.  
Concerning the optimal pricing scheme, we find that the profit-maximizing price 
for mobile applications is strictly higher than zero. Only in the limit case of highly 
collective mobile applications it decreases to zero. Furthermore, we also analyze the 
optimal amount of advertisement firms should include into their mobile applications. 
We find a positive correlation between the optimal amount of advertisement and the 
collectiveness of a mobile application.  
However, the assumptions and results of our model are rather narrow. For example 
we assume that the market is served only by two firms which may not be very realis-
tic. Concerning the income types of [27] we do not consider the use of personal data 
in terms of private information and usage data. According to their architecture mobile 
applications provide a vast number of highly personalized user data which can be 
aggregated and sold by 3
rd
-party vendors or 4
th
-party aggregators. Moreover, may not 
at all be interested in generating monetary profits via their mobile applications. Con-
trary, mobile applications may be used to increase customer loyalty or customer satis-
faction.  
Besides our model explains the micro-economic foundation of pricing, however 
there is also a behavioral component to pricing. For example as we have shown in 
section 3.3 that is not optimal to decrease prices to zero as a reaction to the other firm 
pricing at zero. However as [24] argues, “… pricing modalities  tend do become nor-
mative for all participants – buyers, sellers, and intermediaries. An attempt by any 
1 2 3 4
c
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
p1 p2
  
player to unilaterally deviate from the norm may not succeed even if it would lead to 
an improved situation for all participants.” 
Another aspect that is not covered in the model is the behavioral impact of pricing 
decisions. Prices in mobile market can generate signals like quality, trust, image, and 
maintenance. Furthermore, mobile markets seem to follow threshold prices [5]. 
Consequently, our model is only the first step in the direction of optimal pricing 
strategies in the market for mobile applications. Future research should attempt to 
generalize the underlying assumptions and incorporate more complex pricing 
schemes. 
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Appendix 
Proof 
Maximizing the utility functions        ̂            
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ISSN
Mobile markets as disruptive innovations, have revolutionized 
the software industry. This paper answers the question of optimal 
pricing in the market for mobile applica-tions. The decision about 
the price of mobile applications is one of the most important 
managerial decisions, and the prices set for a mobile application 
plays an important role in positioning, and thereby can have a 
huge economic impact. Based on the model of Hotelling, this 
paper answers the question of optimal pricing in the market for 
mobile applications. To the best of our knowledge this paper is 
the first that classifies mobile applications into individual and 
collective mobile applications. Concerning the optimal pricing 
scheme, we find that the profit-maximizing price for mobile 
applications is strictly positive. These findings are in contrast to 
the dominant pricing scheme observed in mobile markets. Over 
90% of the mobile applications currently offered at the major app 
stores are for free.
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